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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 930566-CA 
GROVE L. FLOWER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance (psilocybin mushrooms), a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1995) . 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1995) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that defendant 
voluntarily consented to the search of the gun safe located in 
his bedroom? 
A trial court's factual findings underlying the 
voluntariness of a consent will be set aside only if a reviewing 
1 
court determines that they are clearly erroneous. The trial 
court's ultimate legal conclusion that a consent is voluntary is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 
(Utah 1993). 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that the search 
of the gun safe was sufficiently attenuated from the activities 
preceding it, which the court had found to be unlawful? 
The same standard of review applies to the issue of 
attenuation. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant provisions are included in the body of this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In September, 1992, defendant was arrested and charged with 
one count each of possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute (marijuana), possession of a controlled 
substance (psilocybin mushrooms), and possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person (R. 8-10). After a preliminary 
hearing, defendant was bound over on the two drug charges to 
district court, where he filed a motion to suppress all evidence 
he believed had been unlawfully seized (R. 22-23) . After a 
hearing in March of 1993, the trial court determined that both a 
2 
protective sweep of the home and the opening of defendant's lunch 
box were unjustified. The court suppressed all evidence except 
that which was found, pursuant to defendant's voluntary consent 
to search, in a gun safe in defendant's bedroom (R. 301-04, 312-
13) . 
The next month, the trial judge inadvertantly signed 
defendant's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 
82-90, 333-35). When the State objected, the court held a 
hearing, set aside the findings and conclusions, and continued 
the matter without date pending the outcome of a federal case 
arising out of the same facts (R. 335). 
A month later, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea 
pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), to one 
count of possession of a controlled substance (R. 102-03, 105-11, 
347) . The trial court sentenced him to zero to five years in the 
Utah State Prison, stayed execution of the sentence, and ordered 
him to serve three years on probation, concurrent with his 
federal sentence (R. 112-13, 355-56). 
Defendant then timely appealed from the trial court's denial 
of his motion to suppress the evidence found in the safe (R. 
114). After defendant had filed his brief, however, the parties 
realized that no findings or conclusions had ever been entered in 
3 
the case and so filed a joint motion to remand for entry of 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order (R. 118C-G). 
This Court granted the motion and, in April of 1994, the trial 
court entered new findings and conclusions (R. 3 07-11 or addendum 
A). Defendant then filed a replacement appellate brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In September of 1992, parole officers Street and Metcalf 
went to the home of Kevin Kelly, a recent parolee, to investigate 
a report of Kelly's possible involvement in a sexual assault (R. 
206, 208, 248-49). Because of the nature of the suspected 
offense and Kelly's long criminal history, the officers asked two 
other agents, Kennington and Haurand, to accompany them (R. 
250) -1 
Kelly, visibly bruised around the face and eyes, arrived at 
his home just moments after the four officers, at about 2:30 p.m. 
Kelly invited the officers inside to talk (R. 151, 152, 155, 171, 
192, 210-11). Upon entering the home, Agents Kennington and 
Metcalf went upstairs with Kelly, while Agents Haurand and Street 
went downstairs to do a protective sweep (R. 140, 175-76, 188, 
1
 Officer Metcalf had only supervised Kelly since his 
release from prison six days prior to this incident. Haurand had 
supervised Kelly on a previous parole (R. 280). 
4 
211-12, 253). No other persons were found in the home. Within 
five minutes, all four officers were upstairs, the sweep competed 
(R. 192, 253). 
About fifteen minutes later, Agent Street asked Agent 
Haurand if he had noticed a set of scales between the bed and 
wall in one of the downstairs bedrooms and marijuana residue on 
the floor of the closet in the same room (R. 214-15, 218). 
Haurand said that he had not (R. 190, 218). Kelly, in response 
to a question from Street, then identified defendant as the 
occupant of the downstairs bedroom and owner of its contents (R. 
219, 281). At this juncture, Agent Kennington initiated two 
telephone calls to obtain a search warrant (R. 220-21, 285). The 
warrant, however, was never procured (R. 273). 
At about 5:00 p.m., defendant, accompanied by his young son, 
was dropped off in front of the home (R. 222, 241, 258). Agent 
Metcalf approached defendant in the front yard, near where Kevin 
Kelly's truck was parked (R. 222, 259). Metcalf explained what 
his fellow agent had seen in the downstairs bedroom and commented 
that he would like to know what was in the gun safe. Defendant 
responded that the safe contained an eighth of an ounce of 
marijuana and two guns (R. 223, 259). Metcalf then asked if he 
could search the safe, and defendant nodded affirmatively, 
5 
stating either "Yeah" or "Yeah, go ahead" (R. 224, 260). Because 
defendant had admitted to having guns, Metcalf pat-searched 
defendant for weapons (R. 223, 261, 275-76). 
Just prior to the pat-search, defendant had put his lunchbox 
down on the hood of Kevin Kelly's truck, and his young son 
climbed up on the truck trying to reach it. Because defendant 
became quite protective of the lunchbox and was seeking to keep 
his son away from it, Agent Metcalf became suspicious and, when 
defendant reached for it, Metcalf took possession of it (R. 224-
25, 261-62, 272-73). At that juncture, defendant said, "It's 
pot, man" (R. 225, 262, 266). Metcalf opened the lunchbox and 
found a half-pound of marijuana inside (R. 263). Defendant was 
taken into custody, handcuffed, and ushered inside the home (R. 
225, 263). 
Once seated in the kitchen, Agent Street read defendant his 
Miranda rights. Defendant said he understood his rights and did 
not wish to make a statement (R. 226, 264). Street then asked 
defendant if he was still willing to consent to a search of the 
safe. Defendant said that he was and, still handcuffed, reached 
around to partially remove some keys from the back pocket of this 
pants. Street took the keys and searched the safe, which 
contained two guns, a small quantity of marijuana, psilocybin 
6 
mushrooms, and a ledger (R. 228, 265, 277) . 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
A consent to search given after a police illegality will be 
considered valid only if two criteria are met. First, the 
consent must be given voluntarily. And, second, the consent must 
be properly attenuated from the misconduct that preceded it. 
The trial court correctly determined that defendant's 
consent, given first during the initial encounter with the 
officer and later reaffirmed after he had been arrested, was 
voluntary. The totality of the factual circumstances, including 
both the characteristics exhibited by defendant and the details 
of the police conduct, support the trial court's determination. 
There is simply no record evidence of coercion or duress. 
As to attenuation, because defendant failed to raise this 
issue in the trial court, he is precluded from doing so for the 
first time on appeal. In the trial court, defendant argued that 
the security sweep constituted a "poisonous tree," tainting 
everything that followed it. He did not engage in any 
exploitation analysis nor did he assert that the opening of the 
lunch box was an independent "poisonous" factor or that it 
affected the consent to search the safe. Attenuation is, 
therefore, waived on appeal. 
7 
But, in any event, an attenuation analysis fails on the 
merits. With the deterrent purposes of the fourth amendment 
exclusionary rule in mind, it is clear that excluding the 
evidence brought to light by defendant's consent would have a 
negligible deterrent effect on future illegalities. In this 
case, the protective sweep was aimed only at the safety of the 
officers entering the home of a parolee whom they suspected to 
have recently been involved in a violent crime and who had 
previously lied to them about the presence of another individual 
in his residence. The sweep was spontaneous, lasted but a few 
minutes, and had nothing at all to do with defendant. In 
addition, more than two and a half hours elapsed between the 
sweep and the time defendant gave his first unequivocal, totally 
cooperative consent. Later, after defendant had been 
"mirandized" and had acknowledged he understood his rights, he 
reaffirmed his consent, both verbally and by handing the key to 
the safe to the officers. Under the circumstances, the trial 
court correctly concluded that both consents were properly 
attenuated from the security sweep. 
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PQINT PNE 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
DETERMINED THAT DEFENDANT 
VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH 
OF THE GUN SAFE 
If a defendant consents to a search after illegal police 
activity, that consent will be valid only if two criteria are 
met. First, defendant's consent to the search must be given 
voluntarily. SctfflggklPth v, gUStflfflgnte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 
(1973); State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). Unless 
the consent is the product of defendant's own free will, it is 
invalid. £££, e,gt SchnecklQth, 412 U.S. at 233; State v, 
Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). Second, the consent 
must not be obtained through police exploitation of the preceding 
illegality. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. The exploitation -- or 
attenuation -- analysis is triggered only upon a determination 
that the consent was voluntarily given. State v. Thurman. 846 
P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
To determine whether a consent has been given voluntarily, 
courts look to the totality of the circumstances, including both 
the "characteristics of the accused" and the "details of police 
conduct." Id. at 1262-63 (quoting Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689 and 
9 
Schneckloth. 412 U.S. at 226). 
Defendant in this case twice voluntarily consented to the 
search of the safe. The first consent occurred in the course of 
the initial conversation with Agent Metcalf, shortly after 
defendant arrived home with his young son (R. 222-24, 259-60). 
Agent Metcalf approached defendant outside the home, identified 
himself, explained that the parole officers were at the home to 
investigate Kevin Kelly, and that one of the agents had seen 
scales, marijuana seeds and residue in front of a safe in the 
basement bedroom. Agent Metcalf then commented that he "sure 
would like to know what was in that safe" (R. 223, 259). In 
response, defendant replied that the safe contained an eighth of 
an ounce of marijuana and a couple of guns (R. 223, 259-60). 
After defendant had volunteered this information, Agent Metcalf 
asked him if he would allow the agents to look in the safe. 
Defendant nodded affirmatively and said, "Yeah" (R. 224, 260). 
Examining first "the characteristics of the accused," what 
stands out graphically is the fact that defendant was entirely 
cooperative, first volunteering information and then responding 
in the affirmative to the agent's single request to search. See 
State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). Defendant 
immediately provided incriminating information to the agents upon 
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a mere indication by Agent Metcalf that he would like to know 
what was in the safe. Agent Metcalf did not explicitly ask 
defendant what was in the safe; he simply mused aloud that he 
would like to know what it contained. Only after defendant 
volunteered that the safe contained guns and marijuana did the 
agent ask for consent to look inside. And, at that juncture, 
defendant promptly agreed to the request. 
As to the conduct of the police, defendant contends that it 
"created a coercive atmosphere which would cause any reasonable 
person to submit to the officer's show of authority" (Br. of App. 
at 16). This assertion, however, is unsupported by both the law 
and the facts. At the outset, the mere presence of uniformed 
officers at a residence does not constitute an undue show of 
authority, as defendant contends (Br. of App. at 15). Plainly, 
an officer may approach a citizen at any time and initiate a 
conversation. See, e.g.. Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) . 
The trial court recognized this fundamental tenet when it 
observed: 
They would have approached him when he came up with the 
lunch box, and given the fact that he was living there with 
Kelly, I think at that juncture they had a right to ask 
additional questions, because they probably have a given 
purpose in ascertaining that he's living there; he had 
anything in the house, and so forth. I don't have any 
problem with that. 
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(R. 302). 
Additionally, numerous factors indicate a lack of duress or 
coercion. See Whittenback. 621 P.2d at 106 (listing relevant 
factors). First, the agents never asserted any claim of 
authority to search. Agent Metcalf did not mention that another 
agent had already initiated the process of obtaining a search 
warrant, or that they would be able to search the safe once the 
warrant was obtained, regardless of defendant's consent. Second, 
the agents never used force or any exhibition of force to induce 
defendant to consent. Third, the agent made a neutral, unadorned 
request to search, unaccompanied by a demand or any other 
intimidating innuendo. Fourth, defendant was entirely 
cooperative. And, fifth, the agents did not engage in any 
deception or trickery that would lead defendant to believe that 
he had no choice but to consent. Id. Additional factors 
include the fact that the encounter occurred in front of the home 
in which defendant lived, rather than in a more intimidating 
atmosphere such as a police cruiser or at the station house. See 
State v Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1274 (Utah App. 1990). Finally, 
while two agents were present during the conversation, only one 
agent interacted with him in any way, thus keeping to the 
absolute minimum any show of authority. See Whittenback, 621 
12 
P.2d at 106. Looking at all of the circumstances surrounding the 
first consent, there is simply no evidence of duress or coercion 
and, hence, no credible evidence to support defendant's 
contention that the consent was not voluntary.2 
Defendant also voluntarily consented a second time to the 
search of the safe. The second consent occurred after defendant 
spontaneously told the agents that his lunch box contained 
marijuana.3 At that juncture, Agent Metcalf arrested defendant, 
2
 Defendant also claims that his consent was involuntary 
because he was in custody at the time and had not yet received 
his Miranda warnings (Br. of App. At 15-16). Miranda warnings 
are required only when an individual is subject to custodial 
interrogation. Miranda V, Arizona, 394 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966). 
That is, Miranda's safeguards apply "as soon as a suspect's 
freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with 
formal arrest."' Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1983) 
(quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per 
curiam)). In this case, the initial conversation between Agent 
Metcalf and defendant had none of the indicia of formal arrest. 
Thus, while defendant may have been seized for fourth amendment 
purposes, he was not in custody for the fifth amendment purposes 
that Miranda was designed to protect. In addition, federal 
courts have consistently held that a consent to search is not the 
kind of incriminating statement that the fifth amendment was 
designed to address. United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia. 983 F2d 
1563, 1568 (10th Cir. 1993) (and cases cited therein). 
3
 Defendant's second consent was merely a reaffirmation of 
his first consent. Because the first consent is the critical 
one, the trial court's ruling that the lunch box opening was 
unlawful becomes irrelevant. That is, the officers opened the 
lunch box only after defendant had voluntarily consented to the 
search of the safe. Any illegality related to the lunch box 
would plainly have no effect on a voluntary consent that preceded 
13 
and Agent Street handcuffed him (R. 225, 263). The three 
proceeded inside to the kitchen, where defendant was seated while 
Agent Street read him his Miranda rights (R. 226, 264).4 
Defendant invoked his rights (Id.). After discussing the 
appropriateness of reaffirming defendant's consent to search the 
safe, Agent Metcalf once again asked defendant if he was still 
willing to consent to a search of the safe. Defendant said 
"yes," reached around to his front pocket, removed the keys to 
the safe, and turned them over to Agent Street (R. 226-27, 265). 
The crux of defendant's argument is that, under the 
circumstances of his recent arrest, defendant was "merely 
acquiesc[ing] to the will of the agents" because of the 
intimidating atmosphere they had created and that he could not, 
therefore, voluntarily consent to the search (Br. of App. at 17-
18). The law is clear, however, that a recent arrest, merely 
accompanied by attendant handcuffing and the presence of 
it. 
4
 Defendant states that his young son was present and 
witnessed at least part of the interaction. Although defendant 
has not articulated the relevance of this assertion, presumably 
it is notable as it might relate to defendant's vulnerability. 
£S£ Stfrte Vr Robinson, 797 P.2d at 437 (quoting Schneckloth. 412 
U.S. at 229) . The record evidence, however, does not reveal 
where defendant's son was at the time defendant gave his second 
consent. 
14 
officers, does not preclude the voluntariness of a consent to a 
warrantless search. See State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1273 
(citing Wfrittenfreck, 621 P.2d at 106 n.14 and State v, Boko, 803 
P.2d 1268, 1273-74 (UtahApp. 1990)). 
Of significance in this instance is the fact that the agent 
read defendant his Miranda rights and that defendant acknowledged 
he understood their import. Invoking his rights, defendant knew 
that anything he said could be used against him. Certainly, when 
a defendant invokes his right to remain silent, the law does not 
impose a concomitant duty on law enforcement officers to also 
remain silent. In this instance, the officers were merely being 
scrupulous, ensuring that the consent defendant had previously 
given was still good. Having just warned defendant about his 
rights, Agent Street was in effect saying, "I know you already 
said we could search the gun safe, but now, knowing what all of 
your specific rights are, do you still want to stand by that 
consent?" The invitation was thus directly extended to defendant 
to retract his previous consent with a simple wno." Instead, 
however, defendant reaffirmed his earlier consent and reached 
around to remove the keys to the safe from his pocket (R. 265). 
At no time did he express any hesitation or attempt to stop or 
restrict the search in any way. Defendant's words and conduct 
15 
thus unequivocally indicated that he was freely consenting to the 
search of the safe. Further, his words and conduct were entirely 
consistent with all of his previous behavior, including 
volunteering to the officers precisely what was in the safe and 
the lunch box, and earlier consenting to the search of the safe. 
In this case, the trial court determined that defendant 
twice consented to the search of the safe located in his bedroom 
and that both consents were voluntarily given. (See addendum A, 
R. 310). While the trial court's findings of fact do not 
explicitly spell out the factual basis for the conclusion of 
voluntariness, the record is sufficiently detailed and complete 
to provide clear support for the court's ultimate determination. 
Under such circumstances, this court may determine on the 
undisputed facts that the State has met its burden of proving the 
voluntariness of both consents. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 787-88 n.6 (Utah 1991); StStS Vt RokinSCT, 797 P.2d 431, 
437 (Utah App. 1990). 
16 
POINT TWO 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO 
PRESERVE HIS ATTENUATION CLAIM IN 
THE TRIAL COURT, HE HAS WAIVED IT 
ON APPEAL. 
On appeal, defendant argues that his consent to search the 
safe was not ''sufficiently attenuated from the illegal sweep and 
illegal search of the lunch box" (Br. of App. at 10). Because 
this is an entirely new argument presented for the first time on 
appeal, it is waived. State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 
1985). 
In defendant's motion to suppress, he argued that "but for 
the initial search [,] the police would never have been led to 
confront Mr. Flower and look in his lunch box" (R. 57). 
Similarly, in closing argument at the suppression hearing, 
defendant focused only on the illegality of the protective sweep, 
asserting that it tainted everything that followed it (R. 299, 
301-02). Defendant's trial court argument thus hinged on a fruit 
of the poisonous tree "but for" analysis, using the protective 
sweep as the poisonous tree (R. 200-302). 
The Utah Supreme Court has specifically eschewed the "but 
for" test on which defendant relies. State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 
684, 688 (Utah 1990)(citing Wona Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 
17 
4711, 487-88 (1963)). That is, all evidence is not "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" just because it would not have been found but for 
the initial police illegality. Id. In some instances, the 
legitimate demands of law enforcement will outweigh the deterrent 
purposes of the exclusionary rule and evidence will be admissible 
despite police misconduct. Id. (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U.S. 590, 608-09 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)). 
The correct test for determining whether such evidence is 
admissible involves a two-part inquiry. The first part, properly 
preserved in the trial court and addressed by both parties on 
appeal/ centers on whether the consent to search was voluntary. 
The second part examines whether the voluntary consent was 
properly attenuated from the police misconduct that preceded it. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. Defendant, however, wholly failed to 
address the attenuation analysis in the trial court. 
Defendant's new appellate counsel, recognizing the flaw in 
trial counsel's analysis, presents an attenuation argument for 
the first time in this appeal, arguing not only that the initial 
consent must be attenuated from the protective sweep, but also 
that the second consent must be attenuated from both the sweep 
and the opening of the lunch box. 
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These arguments, however, have been waived both in whole and 
in part. As a whole, defendant never addressed attenuation in 
the trial court. Notably, the trial court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were the sole focus of a joint motion to 
remand, which this Court granted (R. 118C-G). On remand, if 
defendant believed there was a need for a further attenuation 
analysis or that the findings and conclusions did not properly 
represent the ruling of the court, he should have pointed that 
out to the trial court. Defendant also waived his attenuation 
argument in part. In the trial court, he focused only on the 
security sweep, arguing that it constituted a "poisonous tree" 
that tainted everything that followed it. He never argued that 
the lunch box was an independent "poisonous" factor or that it, 
in any way, affected the consent to search the safe (R. 50-63, 
299-303) . 
The law is well-settled that "with limited exceptions, the 
practice of this court has been to decline consideration of 
issues raised for the first time on appeal." Espinal v. Salt 
Lake City Bd. Of Educ.. 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). Absent 
exceptional circumstances or plain error, neither of which have 
been asserted here, defendant waives consideration of issues 
presented for the first time on appeal. State v. Gibbons. 740 
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P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987). For these reasons, this Court 
should decline to consider defendant's attenuation claim. 
POINT THREE 
DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO SEARCH THE 
SAFE WAS PROPERLY ATTENUATED FROM 
THE PROTECTIVE SWEEP OF THE HOME 
In any event, should this Court choose to consider 
defendant's belated attenuation argument, it would fail on the 
merits. When a consent is voluntary, as here, the other 
necessary inquiry to determine its validity is "whether the 
consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior 
illegality." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. If the consent was 
obtained through such exploitation, the resulting evidence will 
be inadmissible because the primary goal underlying attenuation 
is "to deter the police from engaging in illegal conduct even 
though that conduct may be followed by a voluntary consent to the 
subsequent search." Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1263. 
In this case, the trial court determined that the protective 
sweep of the home was not justified (R. 301, 310).5 Therefore, 
5
 The trial court did not explain the rationale for its 
conclusion that the security sweep was unjustified. On its face, 
the decision seems aberrant. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie. 494 
U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1094 (1990); State v. Velasquez. 672 
P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1983); State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069, 
1072 (Utah 1987). Similarly, because defendant's statement, 
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for defendant's first consent to search the safe to be 
admissible, it must be properly attenuated from the unlawful 
protective sweep of the home.6 The relationship between the two 
events is examined closely "to determine if excluding the 
evidence will effectively deter future illegalities." State v. 
Shoulderblade. 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 27 (Utah 1995) (citations 
omitted). A proper attenuation analysis "requires a balancing of 
"It's pot, man" provides the necessary probable cause to search 
the lunchbox, the trial court's ruling on that matter may also 
constitute legal error. 
6
 Because the State did not cross-appeal the trial court's 
ruling suppressing the scales and the marijuana residue 
discovered during the protective sweep, it cannot contest the 
suppression of that evidence at this late date. See generally 
Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 617 P.2d 700 (Utah 1980). 
However, the law is well-settled that this Court may affirm on 
any alternative grounds. See, e.g.. State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 
1313, 1316 (Utah 1986) . Consequently, this Court may consider 
the correctness of the trial court's conclusion that the security 
sweep was unlawful in the context of the subsequent consent and 
search of the safe. £££. generally Buehner Block Co. V. UWC 
Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); State v. Gallegos. 712 
P.2d 207, 208-09 (Utah 1985). If this Court determines that, 
based on the uncontroverted record facts, the trial court 
committed legal error in concluding that "the sweep was not 
justified," then an attenuation analysis would be rendered 
unnecessary (R. 310 or addendum A). This Court could then affirm 
the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress evidence found 
in the safe simply on the basis that defendant voluntarily 
consented to the search. In this way, evidence suppressed by the 
trial court would remain suppressed, while the evidence admitted 
by the trial court would be justified on alternative grounds. 
Similarly, if this Court finds any relevance in the opening of 
the lunchbox, it could apply a similar analysis to that matter. 
21 
the relative egregiousness of the misconduct against the time and 
circumstances that intervene before the consent is given." 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264. The analysis considers three factors. 
First, this Court examines "the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official misconduct." Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 691 n.4 (citing Brown 
v. Illinois. 422 U.S. at 603-04 (1975)). This factor alone, in 
some instances, may be dispositive. State v. Zieaelman. 276 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 56, 58 (1995)(citing Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264). In 
this case, the stated purpose of the protective sweep was to 
ensure the safety of the officers entering the home to 
investigate the crime in which they suspected Kevin Kelly had 
been involved.7 All four officers who were present testified 
about the purpose of the sweep. Officer Haurand, Kevin Kelly's 
parole supervisor, stated: 
Having known Mr. Kelly's prior lies at home 
visits that nobody is in the residence, we 
weren't sure about our safety or his safety, 
going in there with him, so we did split up. 
And we wanted to sweep the home to make sure 
there weren't any other people inside the 
house. 
7
 The officers were particularly concerned about entering 
Kelly's residence because of their previous experience with him. 
On a prior parole, Kelly had told two of the officers that no one 
else was in his residence. When the officers conducted a 
security sweep, however, they discovered another individual in 
the home (R. 128, 153, 157, 168-69). 
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(R. 175). Officer Haurand entered a downstairs bedroom, noticed 
an open closet that angled down under a staircase, walked over to 
it, and "poked [his head] into this closet" (R. 188). He stated 
that he did so in order to look for "people," specifically "an 
assailant." (R. 188-89). Officer Street elaborated on the 
reasons the officers initiated the security sweep: 
Having already known the nature of the 
allegations against Mr. Kelly, viewing his 
person and the obvious trauma about the 
person, and also having his prior record in 
mind, and incidents on prior paroles, we 
believed it in the best interest of all 
involved to verify who was and was not in the 
residence at that time. 
(R. 211). 
The security sweep was a spontaneous event, lasting less 
than five minutes (R. 253). Officer Kennington stated that up 
until the time Kelly invited the four officers inside, no one had 
mentioned any formal plan for a security sweep. As the officers 
entered the home, however, they decided to split up, make a quick 
sweep of the premises, and then meet in the kitchen to further 
investigate the sexual assault that had prompted their visit in 
the first place (R. 140-41). The Utah Supreme Court has noted 
that "the utility of applying the exclusionary rule to deter 
police misconduct would be of less value where circumstances 
23 
require prompt, unplanned action." Shoulderblade, 276 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 29. The uncontroverted record evidence here supports the 
security sweep as just such an action. 
Under these factual circumstances, it is difficult to see 
how suppression of evidence related to defendant would deter the 
police conduct that the trial court found unlawful. Indeed, the 
purpose of the security sweep was wholly unrelated to defendant. 
The officers not only were not focused on defendant, they had no 
idea he even lived there.8 
As to the flagrancy of the police misconduct, it certainly 
was not glaringly abusive. No evidence suggests that the 
security sweep was ua pretext for collateral objectives'7 or that 
"the purpose of the misconduct was to achieve the consent." 
Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1264. Indeed, the police conduct here was 
about as close to the line of permissibility as possible. In a 
federal firearms case arising out of the same factual 
circumstances, the trial court determined that the same security 
sweep was lawful and admitted all of the evidence that was 
8
 When the protective sweep was conducted, the agents 
believed that "the residence was Mr. Kelly's and his wife's," as 
Kelly had stated in his parole agreement a week earlier (R. 278-
79). Kelly only mentioned that defendant lived in the home after 
the agent stated that he had noticed contraband in a downstairs 
bedroom (R. 278). 
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suppressed in this case.9 The "purpose and flagrancy" prong thus 
points strongly towards proper attentuation and, consequently, 
the validity of the consent. 
A reviewing court next examines the second and third prongs 
of the attenuation analysis. The second prong is the time lapse 
between the unlawful police conduct and the consent to search. 
Id.. at 1274. Temporal proximity has sometimes been termed the 
least probative factor in an attenuation analysis because it does 
not provide critical insight into the relationship between the 
events. Therefore, unlike purpose and flagrancy, temporal 
proximity alone cannot establish exploitation. Shoulderblade. 
276 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28. Considered in conjunction with the 
purpose and flagrancy prong, however, the time lapse indicates 
proper attenuation. Thurman, £,47 P. 2d at 1264. 
Here, there was a substantial break in time. The officers 
arrived at the home at about 2:30 p.m. (R. 152, 191, 231). The 
security sweep was completed by 2:40 p.m. (R. 192). Defendant 
arrived home between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter, he 
9
 £££ United States v. Flower. No. 93-CR-19-A (D.Ct. Utah 
decided April 1, 1993) at 7-8 (unpublished order denying 
defendant's motion to suppress). The published opinions in this 
case from the federal district court and tenth circuit court 
focus on federal firearms charges and do not address the legality 
of the protective sweep. 
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consented to the search of the safe (R. 231, 258). And not long 
afterwards, he reaffirmed his consent (R. 228, 265). In Thurman, 
the time lapse, which the Supreme Court found indicated proper 
attenuation, was five hours. Id. at 1274. In that case, 
however, the initial illegality was quite egregious, with six 
officers, guns drawn, ramming down defendant's front door after a 
magistrate had specifically rejected their request for a no-knock 
warrant. Id. at 1258. In that case, plainly, a more lengthy 
time lapse would be necessary to dissipate the taint created by 
the police conduct. Id. at 1264. Here, however, the protective 
sweep that the trial court found to be unlawful had no earmarks 
of flagrant or egregious misconduct. Thus, temporal proximity is 
a less critical component of proper attenuation. Even so, two-
and-a-half hours constitutes a substantial time break, indicating 
proper attenuation under the circumstances of this case. 
The final factor to be considered is the presence or absence 
of any intervening circumstances relevant to attenuation. If 
these circumstances substantially separate the consent from the 
preceding illegality, then the deterrent value of suppressing the 
evidence will be negligible. X£. In Thurman. the court looked to 
the facts that defendant had received Miranda warnings, that he 
was released from handcuffs at the time he consented, and that he 
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was informed of his right to consent. Id. at 1274. 
In this case, prior to the initial consent defendant 
volunteered plainly incriminating statements to the officers. 
When defendant first arrived home, Officer Metcalf approached 
him, told him what had been seen in the downstairs bedroom, and 
mused aloud that "he sure would like to know what was in that 
safe" (R. 259). Defendant at that point offered that the safe 
contained guns and marijuana. Defendant's own conduct thus 
consitutes a significant intervening factor. 
In addition, prior to reaffirming his consent, defendant was 
given his Miranda warnings, which he verbally acknowledged that 
he understood. After defendant invoked his rights, he was 
specifically afforded a clear opportunity by the agents to 
withdraw his previously-given consent. Instead of withdrawing 
it, however, he verbally and through his unequivocal conduct 
reaffirmed his consent. And, in contrast to the five hours 
preceding Thurman's consent, where Thurman was "essentially 
shackled," defendant here was physically unrestrained and free to 
move about during the time preceding his formal arrest. The 
presence of relevant intervening factors, therefore, also 
indicates proper attenuation. 
In sum, even though the trial court held that the protective 
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sweep was illegal, defendant's subsequent consent to search and 
his later reaffirmation of that consent were sufficiently removed 
from the protective sweep so as not to invalidate the search of 
the safe in his bedroom. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 




GROVE L. FLOWER, : 
Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant. : 
FTNPINGS OF FACTS 
1. On or about September 14, 1992, Adult Probation and Parole Agent 
Arthur Street received a complaint that a parolee by the name of Kevin Kelley had been 
involved in an aggravated sexual assault. Mr. Street contacted Keliey's parole officer 
Steve Metcalf and they decided to go to Mr. Keliey's address to conduct a home visit. 
Agents Street and Metcalf were joined by Agents Hauraund and Kennington who had 
previously supervised Kelley while he was on parole. 
2. Agents Hauraund and Kennington had conducted a previous home visit 
with parolee Kelley on February 24, 1992. At the beginning of this home visit Kelley 
was asked by the agents if anyone else was in the house. Kelley denied having anyone in 
C03C7 
the house with him. The agents heard noises from a back bedroom and discovered a man 
hiding in the back bedroom. This incident was resolved without any violence. 
3. Parolee Kelley had a past history of violent criminal behavior including 
aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault charges. Kennington, Hauraund, Metcalf 
and Street knew that Kelley had hidden a person at his residence before and had lied 
about the person to the parole agents, they also knew that Kelley had a past record of 
violence. Kelley's parole agreement provided that the agents could search his residence if 
they had reasonable suspicion that a probation violation had been committed by Kelley. 
4. Parolee Kelley had reported to the Parole Department that the only 
persons living at his residence at 4256 South 4940 West was his wife, Donna Kelley. The 
agents had no knowledge on September 14, 1992, that any other persons lived in the 
house. 
4(a). In actuality, Kelley was renting a room from Grove Flower. 
5. The Parole Agents went to Kelleyfs house at 4256 South 4940 West in 
Salt Lake County on September 14, 1992. Upon arrival Agents Metcalf and Street 
approached the front door while agents Hauraund and Kennington went around back to 
prevent anyone from leaving through a back exit. 
6. While in the back of the residence agents Hauraund and Kennington 
noticed a Pit Bull Terrier on the back yard of the residence. The Pit Bull would run to the 
back door. The Pit Bull did this several times causing Agents Kennington and Hauraund 
to believe that someone may have been in the house. Agents Street and Metcalf had 
knocked on the front door of the house and had received no response. 
7. Kelley arrived at the house a few minutes after the agents had knocked 
on the door. Kelley had obviously been in a physical confrontation, he had a black eye 
and a laceration on the back of his head. The agents identified themselves and the reason 
for their visit. Kelley asked if they could talk about this inside the house away from the 
view of the neighbors and invited the agents inside the house. When the agents and 
2 
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view of the neighbors and invited the agents inside the house. When the agents and 
Kelley arrived at the front door the agents asked Kelley if anyone was in the house and he 
indicated he didn't think so but that he was not sure. 
8. Agents Kennington and Metcalf accompanied Kelley upstairs while 
Agents Street and Hauraund testified that they proceeded downstairs to conduct a 
protective sweep. They did not discuss the protective sweep among themselves. 
9. During the protective sweep Agent Street observed a set of scales with 
marijuana residue on them and a gun locker with marijuana residue in front of it in the 
downstairs south east comer bedroom. Agent Hauraund had not observed the residue or 
scales in his sweep of the room and closet. Agent Street entered the bedroom after Agent 
Hauraund had already looked in the room. Agent Hauraund observed a box of 
ammunition in the kitchen area upstairs. 
10. After the protective sweep was finished the agents asked Kelley who 
was using the Southeast basement bedroom. He replied that it was used by Grove 
Flower. The agents made telephone calls about obtaining a search warrant. 
11. At approximately 5:15 p.m., Grove Flower was dropped off at the 
residence by a vehicle. Agents Street and Metcalf were on the porch when Flower arrived 
home. They met Flower on the front yard and identified themselves and explained the 
reason for their visit. 
12. Agent Metcalf told Mr. Flower about finding the safe, scales and 
marijuana residue and mentioned "I sure would like to know what's in the safe." Mr. 
Flower responded by saying Til tell you there is an eighth ounce of marijuana and some 
guns in the safe. Agent Metcalf asked permission to search inside the safe and Flower 
gave him permission to search. 
13. Given the fact that Flower had indicated that he owned firearms Agent 
Metcalf determined to do a Terry frisk on Flower. During the Terry frisk Flower set 
down a lunch pail on the hood of Kelley's truck. After setting the lunch pail down 
3 C03C9 
Flower's son attempted to take the lunch box and Flower grabbed the lunch box in a 
protective fashion. Agent Metcalf took the lunch box and Flower stated "It's pot man." 
At that time Metcalf opened the lunch box and discovered it to contain one-half pound of 
marijuana. 
14. Flower was placed under arrest and was taken into the house. Where he 
was Mirandized. Flower invoked his Miranda Rights. Flower was asked if he would 
consent to a search of his safe, he gave his consent and reached into his pocket to retrieve 
a key to the safe. The agents terminated their efforts to obtain a search warrant. 
15. When the safe was opened two firearms, one-eighth ounce marijuana, 
psylocybin mushrooms, money and a ledger were found. 
From the foregoing Findings of Facts the Court makes the following 
conclusion of law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court finds that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to 
believe that there was another individual in the house which posed a danger to them and 
therefore the protective sweep was not justified. The scales and marijuana fragments 
found during the protective sweep are suppressed. 
2. The officers search of the defendant's lunch box was not a valid Terry 
search nor was it a valid search incident to arrest. The contents of the lunch box are 
suppressed. 
3. The initial consent given by the defendant to search the safe when he 
was contacted in the front yard of the house was sufficiently attenuated from the 
protective sweep and was voluntary. The subsequent consent given by the defendant after 
his arrest and after his Miranda rights had been given to him was attenuated from the 
protective sweep and was voluntary. The search of the safe was a valid consent search 
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and the contents of the safe are not suppressed. 
DATED this /(J day of M 3 r cC^ , 1994. 
Approved as to form: 
Counsel for Defendant 
BY THE COURT 
The!: Honorable John A. Rokich 
""Sfedge of The Third District Court 
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GROVE L. FLOWER, 
Defendant. 
CaseNo.921901772FS 
Judge John A. Rokich 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, and good 
cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. The scales and marijuana fragments found during the protective sweep 
are suppressed; 
2. The marijuana found in the lunch box is suppressed; 
3. The firearms, marijuana, psylocybin mushrooms, money and ledger 
found in the safe are not suppressed. 
DATED this Jj_ day of /VlthecH 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
Tha Honorable John a. Rokich 
utfge of The Third District Court 
ftff 
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